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Article 4

THE CAPACITY OF AN INFANT TO
ACQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT DOMICILE
By

WILLIAm

KONOP

The queston of domicile has ever held an important place in
litigations. The laws of states and nations differ both in the procedural rules they follow and in the substanitve doctrines they
expound. Hence it often happens that in a given situation being
domiciled in a particular jurisdiction gives you a cause of action
which you would not have if domiciled elsewhere. Even oftener
a more favorable interpretation of your case is to be found under
the decisions of one state or nation than under those of another.
The question of domicile is raised frequently in cases regarding
the settlements of estates, in suits for divorce, in cases involving
corporations, and in attempts to give federal courts jurisdiction
on the theory of diversity of citizenship. In the settlement of
estates, for example, the laws of nations and states with regard to
probate and adminsitration are very diverse. There is an axiom
that "the law of the state in which the decedent had his domicile
at the time of his death will control the succession and distribution o his personal estate." In the case of White v. Tennant, 31"
W. VA. 790, the question arose as to whether the domicile of
the deceased at the time of his death was in Pennsylvania or
West Virginia. Administration was granted in West Virginia
under whose law the widow took all personalty after the payment
of debts. On appeal the domicile of the deceased was shown
to have been Pennsylvania at the time of his death and the widow
was, under the latter state's rules, only entitled to one-half of
the excess personal property.
Domicile is "a residence at a particular place, accompanied
by an intention, either positive or presumptive, to remain there
permanently or for an indefinite length of time" (19 CJ 394). A
person's domicile of origin is "the domicile of his parents at the
time of his birth" (In re Jones' Estate, 192 Ia 78). A domicile
of choice is "the place which a person has elected and chosen for
himself to displace his previous domicile" (Ibid). Domicile by
operation of law is "that domicile which the law attributes to a
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persdn independant of his intention or action of residence. This
generally results from the domestic relations of husband and
wife, or parent and child" (Ibid).
Ordinarily the domicile of an infant is, by operation of
law, that of his father. "Every person at his birth acquires a
domicile of origin, which is that of the person on whom he is
legally dependant, and in the case of a legitimate child is that
of its father." (Deleware, L & W R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 250 Fed.
554). An infant is non sui juris and at 6ommon law and under
the statutes practically universally does not become sui juris
until twenty- one years of age. Upon the death of the father the
child's domicile is under the control of his mother, though some
jurisdictions hold she cannot change the child's domicile detrimentally to his legal rights. Upon remarriage of the mother,
by operation of law, she surrenders her domicile for that of her
husband, and ipso facto loses control of the domicile of her child,
whose domicile thereafter is that of his mother before remarriage.
(Lamar v. Micou, 112 US 452; In re Tharpe 24 NY 444). The
father in changing his own domicile changes that of his wife and
children. In case of the death of both parenfs the grandfather or
grandmother may control the minor's domicile. Adopting parents exercise like control, (Matter v. Johnson, 87 Ia 130) but
guardians usually cannot. The law is fair in so establishing the
child's domicile, for upon the parent evolves the duty to support,
in return for which it is only just that he be given the power to
control the child's movements. It is to the best advantage of
child and state that the minor be under the care and guidance
of his parents, his natural guardians.
As a general 'rule the infant is incapable of changing his
domicile by his own act. "An infant's domiclie is not affected
by the removal of the infant from its former domicile by an unauthorized person or by the infant's own act without the consent.
of parent or guardian" -(Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Ind 46). The
mere leaving of his home by a minor and his living elsewhere
do not create for him a new domicile in the eyes of the law. (Hess
v. Kimball, 82 NJEq 311), The infant has no legal residence of
his own, whatever his abode. His legal residence is that of his
father. (In re Tharpe, 24 NY 444)
There are three situations creating a capacity in the infant
who has reached the age of discretion to change his domicile from
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that of his parent. They are emancipation, abandonment, and
marriage. All there are much challenged and none is universally held to be an occurrence that allows an infant to chose his
own domicile.
On the qestion of emancipation early cases cited in 10
Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2nd Ed) 31, note hold that an emancipated minor may gain a settlement of his own. (Dennysville
v. Trescott, 30 Me 470; Charleston v. Boston, 13 Mass 469; and
Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 NH 453). The recent case of Jackson v.
Southern Flour and Grain Co., 146 Ga 153, indicates that emanicipation empowers the infant to change his domicile in saying
that the domicile of an infant is his father's, if the father is living,
and parental authority is not voluntarily relinquished. The case
of Russell v. State, 62 Neb. 512, directly held that an emancipated
infant could establish a domicile for himself. There, a young
man, being emancipated by his father, left his domicile of origin
in New York and took up his residence in Nebraska. After
being there for eight months he was called for jury service and
sat in a murder trial, having only come of age one month before
the trial. By law male persons over twenty-one, having the
qualifications of electors were made competent for jury service.
To be a qualified voter you had to be over twenty-one and to
have resided in the country for six months. The defendant said
the young man was not qualified, arguing that his residence until he was twenty-one years of age was New York, with his
father. The court said that by emancipation the father had empowered the minor to choose his own domicile, and concluded
that the young man had the requisite six months' Nebraska residence.
A case suggesting abandonment as giving the minor who
has reached the age of discretion the privelege of changing his
domicile is that 6f Bjornquisf v. Boston & A. R. Co., 25 Fed. 929.
This case however merely suggests the proposition just mentioned and is not authority for it. It is authority for the proposition that any minor orphan who has reached the age of discretion may choose his own domicile. Here the minor's parents
had died and an uncle who had been caring for the child decided
to do so no longer. Being nineteen years old and left to shift
for himself the minor decided to leave Massachusetts, where he
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had cause of action for personal injuries against the defendant
corporation of Massachusetts; he went to Maine and there commenced suit in the federal court. Later he returned to Massachusetts. Defendant pleaded that there was no diversity of
citizenship at the time of the commencement of the suit, saying
that the last domicile of the plaintiff's deceased parent was Massachusetts, and that the infant having no power to change his
domicile was, at the time of the commencement of the suit, domiciled in Massachusetts, despite his residence in Maine. The court
decided that the plaintiff, 1.eft to his own devices, was capable of
selecting his own domicile despite his minority. The court said,
"None of the cases which have come to our attention have gone
to the extent of holding that, under such circumstances, a minor
who has attained years of discretion may not acquire a new domicile. In all of them, where it has been held that a minor cannot
acquire a new domicile of his own volition, it has appeared that
he was of immature years, or that he was subject to the direction and control of a person standing. in the position of a natural
or statutory guardian." (Citing cases). Being of tender years
was mentioned as preventing an infant's change 6i domicile by
his own volition in Loftin v. Carden, 203 Ala 405, and Miller v.
Bode, 80 Ind App 338. A child abandoned by his father took
residence with his grandparent. and upon the return of the father
was held to continue domiciled with his grandparent. (In re
Vance, 92 Cal 195).
On the question of the effect of marriage on the infant's
capacity to acquire domicile the early case of Trammel v. Trammel, 20 Tex 406, held that a married male minor could not change
his domicile. His emancipation by marriage is not to such a degree. The later case of Deleware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Petrowsky,
250 Fed 554 affirmed this rule The case further held that when
once emancipated, as the minor in the case on being apprenticed
to a relative, the subsequent death of the master worked no return to the control of the father so as to deny the minor's right
to choose his own domicile thereafter. A minor female, unlike
a male, upon her marriage escapes the parental control of
domicile, but by operation of law takes that of her husband.
A great list of authorities cited in Ann. Cas 1913E 1206 and in
27 QJ 411 denies the right of the infant to change his domicile
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and declares his domicile to follow that of his parent. This is
perhaps for the best, but as a Pennsylvania judge said in the
early case of Mintzer's Estate, 2 Pa Dist 584, "The rule by which
the domicile of a minor is made to follow that of the parent
ought not to be regarded as of inflexible obligation. Cases must
arise, in which to avoid hardships amounting-to cruelty, an infant
may acquire a domicile independent of the domicile of his parents."

